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 PASS OR FAIL?  GRADING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRESS 
TESTS A DECADE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It has been about a decade since the Financial Crisis of 2008—
the worst financial downturn since the Great Depression—often termed 
the “great recession.”1  The American financial system was shaken to its 
core, unemployment rose rapidly,2 and major banks neared insolvency.3  
While some institutions were bailed out, such as American International 
Group (“AIG”) and Bear Stearns, others, most notably Lehman Brothers, 
were left to fend for themselves and ultimately ended up filing for bank-
ruptcy.4  
In the wake of the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve began sub-
jecting larger banks to annual “stress tests” to determine whether they 
have enough capital to continue lending as normal when faced with 
stressful market conditions such as double digit unemployment, huge de-
creases in the housing market, and negative GDP growth over several 
quarters.5  The Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”), enacted in 2010, made 
 
 1. See Lawrence Mishel & Heidi Shierholz, The Worst Downturn Since the Great De-
pression, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 2, 2009), https://www.epi.org/publica-
tion/jobspict_200906_preview/ (examining how the financial downturn of the late 2000s 
stacks up to the Great Depression and other recessions).  
 2. See id. (detailing the statistics behind the 2008 financial crisis).  
 3. See David Stout, The Wall Street Bailout Plan, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21qanda.html (reporting on how the 
government calculated a $700 billion bailout plan and why they chose to do so).  
 4. See Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy, HISTORY.COM (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.his-
tory.com/this-day-in-history/lehman-brothers-collapses (detailing the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers – the largest bankruptcy in US history).  
 5. See generally History of the Basel Committee, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/his-
tory.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2018) (explaining that before the financial recession banks 
largely conducted their own stress tests).  In 2007, governmental regulatory bodies became 
more interested in supervising these tests or conducting the tests themselves.  One such action 
was set out in the Basel Accords promulgated by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
(BCBS), an international committee formed to develop standards for banking regulation. Un-
til the enacting of Dodd-Frank, different regulatory bodies like the International Monetary 
Fund provided some level of oversight but Dodd-Frank gave more substantial control in the 
process.  Ryan Tracy, What Are the Fed’s Stress Tests?, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2018, 12:06 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-are-the-feds-stress-tests-1529487001 (tracking dif-
ferences in the 2018 stress tests versus previous years). 
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these annual tests mandatory for banks of a certain size.6  As the ten year 
mark of the implementation of these stress tests approaches, it is an ap-
propriate time to review how these tests have fared in both predicting the 
health of large banks and bolstering the banking industry.  
In the coming years, the rigor of the stress tests may change if 
banks are successful in promoting deregulation.7  The United States 
Treasury released a report to President Trump in response to Executive 
Order 13772, which the President signed in early 2017, that detailed in-
efficiencies and excess costs caused by the current regulatory scheme.8  
This Note examines how the stress tests have strengthened the banking 
sector over the past decade and the role and effectiveness the tests will 
have in the future if they are relaxed through legislation or otherwise.  
Specifically, this note examines the competing arguments surrounding 
the calls to relax the tests – are the banks sufficiently prepared at this 
point and no longer need to keep raising capital levels at the rate the Fed-
eral Reserve is requiring? Are the banks really being restrained from 
growing the economy further if they had more freedom? Or, rather, would 
loosening the stress tests put the banking industry at a substantial risk of 
plunging right back into another financial crisis? 
Part II provides the background of  Dodd-Frank that was enacted 
in response to the 2008 financial crisis.9  Part III examines the impact the 
legislation has had on the banking landscape, specifically the capital po-
sition of the large banks and how their financial decisions in regards to 
dividends and stock buybacks are made in accordance with legislation.10  
Part III also considers the impact of recent roll backs of parts of Dodd-
Frank.  Finally, Part IV discusses the possibility of future changes in the 
law in the light of the Trump Administration’s agenda.11  The arguments 
 
 6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 1101, 
12 U.S.C. § 5327 (2012) (setting asset threshold for banks to be subjected to submitting fi-
nancial reports for use of regulations).  
 7. See Emily Flitter & Jim Tankersley, Bank ‘Stress Tests’ Results Clear Way for Wall 
Street to Reward Investors, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/06/28/business/bank-stress-tests-fed.html (reporting how the results of this 
year’s second round of stress tests will be used by the banks to lobby for further deregulation 
given their relative success over the past decade).  
 8. Exec. Order No.13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (2017) (ordering the Secretary of the 
Treasury to report on Dodd-Frank’s effectiveness); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 
(June 2017) [hereinafter ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES].  
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III.  
 11. See infra Part IV.  
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of regulation proponents and opponents will be weighed to address where 
the banking industry might be heading, and where it should be heading.  
II.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND BANK STRESS TESTS 
Dodd-Frank is the most significant banking legislation enacted 
since the Great Depression.12  It was enacted in direct response to the 
financial crisis exposing the lack of preparedness of the nation’s big 
banks and their regulators.13  Due to this lack of preparedness, the federal 
government and the American citizens, by virtue of taxes, had to bail out 
some big banks while others failed, further compounding the adverse ef-
fects of the recession.14 Essentially, the stress tests require big banks to 
hold enough capital to ensure a 2008–2009 bank crisis never happens 
again.15  
Before the financial crisis of 2008, regulators and financial insti-
tutions were already conducting various forms of stress testing.16  How-
ever, the origin of the current supervisory stress tests can be traced back 
to 2009 when, in the midst of the financial crisis, supervisors conducted 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (“SCAP”), a series of stress 
tests of the nineteen largest bank holding companies (“BHC”).17  The 
SCAP sought to address the uncertainty that investors and the public had 
in these large BHCs concerning its solvency and ability to lend by 
 
 12. See Dodd-Frank Act, HISTORY.COM (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.history.com/top-
ics/21st-century/dodd-frank-act (summarizing the sheer weight Dodd-Frank had on the finan-
cial industry).  
 13. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS 
TEST 2017:  SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS – JUNE 2017 (Sept. 7, 
2017) [hereinafter BD. OF GOVERNORS 2017] https://www.federalreserve.gov/publica-
tions/2017-june-dodd-frank-act-stress-test-background-on-dodd-frank-act-stress-testing.htm 
(providing background on Congress’ enactment of Dodd-Frank).  
 14. See Mike Collins, The Big Bank Bailout, FORBES (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-big-bank-bailout/#1ab762442d83 
(examining the government’s bailout plan and where the funding came from). 
 15. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
1101, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012) (“To promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end too big to fail, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive finan-
cial services practices, and for other purposes.”).  
 16. See TIM P. CLARK & LISA H. RYU, FED. RESERVE BD., CCAR AND STRESS TESTING AS 
COMPLIMENTARY SUPERVISORY TOOLS (2015) (providing historical context for current CCAR 
and Dodd-Frank stress tests).  
 17. See id. (discussing how the current stress tests and CCAR originated from 2009 stress 
testing done in an immediate response to the current financial crisis).  
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requiring the BHCs to raise their capital levels.18  SCAP assessed whether 
a BHC had sufficient capital to incur losses and continue operating as a 
financial intermediary and, if it did not, required that bank to raise their 
capital levels within six months.19  A unique feature of SCAP is that the 
U.S. Treasury provided a capital backstop in the event that the nineteen 
BHCs failed to raise their respective capital levels in the six month pe-
riod.20  Additionally, SCAP was the first time that supervisors released 
individual results of each bank’s tests to the public.21  This public disclo-
sure, coupled with the perceived credibility of the SCAP stress tests, sig-
nificantly contributed to restoring the confidence in the country’s banking 
system.22  
Taking lessons learned from the SCAP, the stress tests that are in 
place today were rolled out the following year in 2010.23  These stress 
tests—the Dodd-Frank stress tests and the Comprehensive Capital Anal-
ysis and Review (CCAR) stress tests—originally applied to banks with 
more than $50 billion in total assets, which was the asset threshold for a 
BHC to be considered “systematically important” (the “SIFI threshold”) 
and be subjected to the Federal Reserve’s “enhanced prudential stand-
ards” (essentially the most stringent of regulation standards) in its assess-
ment.24  Together the Dodd-Frank and CCAR tests include both a quan-
titative and qualitative portion and are used conjunctively by the Federal 
Reserve to determine whether a financial institution has sufficient capital 
to continue operating through different measures of economic stress.25  
While complimentary to one another in use by the Federal Reserve, the 
 
 18. See id. (detailing the goals of SCAP and the process designed to achieve those goals).  
 19. See id. (providing the requirements of SCAP used by the Federal Reserve in an at-
tempt to stabilize the financial system). 
 20. See id. (detailing the capital backstop created by the U.S. Treasury in an effort to 
ensure the banks stabilization efforts would not fail).  
 21. See id. (discussing how the release of bank-by-bank results helped improve confi-
dence in the banking system).  
 22. See id. (complimenting the overall progress that SCAP had towards stabilizing the 
financial system).  
 23. See id. (citing the influence of SCAP on the provisions of Dodd-Frank and the Com-
prehensive Capital Analysis and Review).  
 24. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM 
LEGISLATION (2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publica-
tions/SC_Publication_Financial_Services_Regulatory_Reform_Legislation_05_24_18.pdf 
(providing the standard of regulations banks were subjected to by Dodd-Frank).  
 25. See ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8 (detailing the complementary nature of 
the Dodd-Frank stress tests and CCAR stress tests).  
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two tests are distinct.26  The Dodd-Frank stress test is a forward-looking, 
quantitative evaluation of the impact of poor financial market conditions 
and stressful economic pressures on a firm’s capital.27  The enhanced pru-
dential standards applied to all BHCs with $50 billion or more in total 
assets and required stress tests to be conducted by both the Federal Re-
serve (supervisory-run tests) and the BHCs themselves (i.e., company-
run tests).28  Additionally, the enhanced prudential standards require 
BHCs to establish risk committees and to meet various capital and lever-
age ratios.29  As a whole, Dodd-Frank stress tests serve to “inform the 
Federal Reserve, firms, and the general public of how institutions’ capital 
ratios might change under a hypothetical set of stressful economic condi-
tions.”30  In particular, the quantitative portion of the test evaluates a 
firm’s capital adequacy after subjecting the bank to three stress scenarios: 
baseline, adverse, and severely adverse.31  
The second assessment conducted by the Federal Reserve, 
CCAR, contains both a quantitative and qualitative portion.32  The quan-
titative portion of the CCAR assessment is largely the same as the super-
visory-run Dodd-Frank stress tests, except that CCAR takes into account 
a financial institution’s planned capital distributions when conducting the 
test, whereas the Dodd-Frank stress test assumes a firm’s capital distri-
butions will be consistent with prior distributions.33  The qualitative por-
tion of the test involves the Federal Reserve making evaluations about a 
firm’s capital adequacy after taking into consideration the firm’s planned 
capital distributions, such as stock buybacks or dividend payments.34  The 
 
 26. See ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8 (distinguishing Dodd-Frank and CCAR 
as two separate exercise although used complimentary).  
 27. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS 
TEST 2018: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS – JUNE 2018 (2018) 
[hereinafter BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018], https://www.federalreserve.gov/publica-
tions/files/2018-dfast-methodology-results-20180621.pdf. 
 28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §165(i), 
12 U.S.C § 5365(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 29. See BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27 (showing all the various calculations 
each BHC are tested with to determine several ratios such as the Tier 1 capital ratio, Tier 1 
leverage ratio, and the supplementary leverage ratio).  
 30. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27.  
 31. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27.  
 32. See ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8 (summarizing the assessment procedure 
of CCAR).  
 33. See ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 8 (distinguishing the quantitative meth-
odologies, data, and processes used in the supervisory-run Dodd-Frank stress tests from the 
CCAR).  
 34. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27.  
338 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
qualitative portion also gives the Federal Reserve broad discretion to 
make subjective evaluations about a bank’s capital planning, including 
the bank’s governance, risk identification, risk management, internal au-
dit, and all-around control of those practices.35  The Federal Reserve as-
sesses whether the banks have enough capital to continue lending as nor-
mal through stressful economic conditions, “even after making all 
planned capital distributions.” 36  As of May 2018, legislation makes the 
CCAR only applicable to banks with more than $250 billion in assets and 
the Dodd-Frank stress tests apply only to banks with more than $100 bil-
lion in assets.37 
At the conclusion of the CCAR, the Federal Reserve either ob-
jects to a firm’s capital plan or does not object.38  Colloquially, the Fed-
eral Reserve’s decision means that the bank either “passed” or “failed” 
their test.39  If the Federal Reserve “objects” to a firm’s capital plan, the 
firm’s capital distribution plan40 is limited to whatever amount the Fed-
eral Reserve permits in writing.41  Sometimes, a bank will be given a 
“conditional pass” of a stress test.42  This either means that a bank came 
quite close to failing the stress test or the Federal Reserve found its deci-
sion to object or not was being affected by an outside influence.  Such 
was the case with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley’s “conditional 
pass” in 2018, in which the banks technically failed but for a reason that 
 
 35. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27; see also CCAR AND DFAST: REACHING THE 
SUMMIT, DELOITTE (July 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Docu-
ments/regulatory/us-reg-ccar-dfast-reaching-the-summit.pdf (detailing some major areas that 
the Fed typically finds issues with during the qualitative portion of the stress tests).   
 36. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27. 
 37. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act §2155, 12 
U.S.C. §401 (2012); 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017).  
 38. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27. 
 39. See Tracy, supra note 5 (examining the Federal Reserve’s movement toward elimi-
nating the ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ grades from stress tests in 2019 while referring to the test results by 
the colloquial term). 
 40. A firm’s capital distribution plan refers to the value of dividends the firm planned to 
pay out or to the number of stock shares it planned to buy back.  SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, 
supra note 24.  
 41. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27. 
 42. See Peter Eavis, Wells Fargo Sailed Through Its Stress Test. Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley, Not So Much., N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/06/29/business/dealbook/fed-stress-tests.html?rref=collection%2Ftime-
stopic%2FBanking%20Industry (reporting on the “conditional passes” of Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs in latest round of stress tests). 
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was deemed outside their control.43  Typically, banks that pass on a con-
ditional basis have to resubmit their capital plan of action for review to 
the Federal Reserve.44  In the case of Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
Sachs, both had their failures attributed to the recent tax bill enacted by 
Congress.45  Specifically, the lower tax rate resulted in each firm’s de-
ferred tax assets being worth less in the future which subsequently re-
duced the firm’s current capital.46  Additionally, the new tax bill was im-
plemented right before the Federal Reserve collected the data for the tests, 
which left the banks without adequate time to make necessary changes.47  
Considering these unconventional circumstances, the Federal Reserve 
concluded that the tax bill would deplete their capital in the short-term 
but bolster earnings over time.48  Accordingly, the Federal Reserve de-
cided to allow Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to make dividend 
payments on the condition that their payouts remained at the same level 
as the previous year.49  While Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs did 
technically fall below the minimum capital requirements, the two firms 
fell below only on the most severe stress tests and only after accounting 
for the amount of stock buybacks and dividend payments the firms 
wanted to make.50  That is, they passed the quantitative portion of the test 
 
 43. See id. (reporting that Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs passed the quantitative 
portion of the test and their “conditional pass” of the qualitative test was due solely to adverse 
effects from the new tax bill). 
 44. See Bank Stress Test, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bank-
stress-test.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (providing general overview of the Federal Reserve’s 
stress tests and how they operate in practice when a bank receives a conditional pass).  
 45. See Joseph Lawler, Tax Cuts Trip Up Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, State Street 
in Stress Tests, WASH. EXAM’R (June 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/pol-
icy/economy/tax-cuts-trip-up-goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-state-street-in-stress-tests (dis-
cussing how Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley’s low capital levels were negatively af-
fected by the GOP’s 2018 tax bill).  
 46. See id. (detailing how the tax bill results in only a one time hit for Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs).  
 47. See id. (explaining how the short notice of the new tax bill also played a part in banks, 
such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, being unable to adjust before the Federal Re-
serve conducted the tests). 
 48. Eavis, supra note 42.  
 49. Eavis, supra note 42.  
 50. See Hugh Son, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley Left Out of the Rally in Bank Stocks 
After Fed Stress Test Blunder, CNBC (June 28, 2018, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/28/goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-keep-dividends-andbuy-
backs-unchanged-af.html (discussing how Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs narrowly 
missed on their leverage requirements but were still given a conditional pass).  
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and only narrowly missed the mark on the qualitative portion.51  The min-
imum required tier 1 leverage ratio was set at 4.5% this past year—Gold-
man Sachs’ ratio was 4.4% and Morgan Stanley’s ratio was 4.3%.52  Con-
sidering the firms narrowly missed the mark under only the severely 
adverse scenario and the fact that the firms experienced a one-time loss 
due to the recent tax bill, it seems highly unlikely, if a financial crisis had 
actually occurred last year, that either firm would have actually failed.53  
When a bank receives a “conditional pass,” the public is made aware of 
the near failure, which can carry a stigma and have repercussions of its 
own.54  On the morning the Federal Reserve released the results of the 
2018 stress tests, banks that easily cleared the tests, such as Wells Fargo, 
saw stock increase 5.4%.55  Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, on the 
other hand, suffering from the negative public perception of a “condi-
tional pass,” saw their stocks go up less than 0.3% during that same 
time.56 
III.  THE IMPACT OF STRESS TESTS, CCAR, AND RECENT DEREGULATION 
Where has the mandatory stress testing embedded in the stagger-
ing 2300 pages of legislation that is the Dodd-Frank Act gotten us?57  The 
passing of Dodd-Frank undoubtedly kick-started wide spread changes 
throughout the banking sector.58  In designing the stress tests pursuant to 
 
 51. See id. (discussing how Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs narrowly missed on 
their leverage requirements under the qualitative portion of the test but were still given a con-
ditional pass and did indeed pass the quantitative portion as well). 
 52. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27. 
 53. See Son, supra note 50 (detailing how regulators gave the two firms conditional non 
objections in light of all these factors).  
 54. See N.Y.S.E, Historical Quote June 21, 2018, MKT. WATCH, https://www.mar-
ketwatch.com/investing/stock/ms/historical (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (showing that Goldman 
Sachs’s and Morgan Stanley’s stock price dropped near the lowest value of the entire year the 
week surrounding the Federal Reserve’s announcement of their “conditional pass”); Steve 
Goldstein, Fed Limits Payouts at Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Again Faults Deutsche 
Bank, MKT. WATCH (June 28, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-lim-
its-payouts-at-goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-again-faults-deutsche-bank-2018-06-28 (re-
capping how Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs’s stock price reacted when the Fed released 
the news of a “conditional pass”).  
 55. See Son, supra note 50 (listing the different stock market reactions to the Fed’s re-
lease of the stress tests results).  
 56. See Son, supra note 50 (discussing Morgan Stanley’s and Goldman Sachs’s poor 
stock increase in light of the news of a conditional pass to the public).  
 57. See FIN. SERV. COMM., OVERSIGHT OF DODD-FRANK ACT IMPLEMENTATION (2017), 
https://financialservices.house.gov/dodd-frank/ (providing background on Dodd-Frank’s path 
through legislation). 
 58. Id. 
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Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve wants to see banks stay afloat amid po-
tential economic downturns and be able to continue operating and lending 
as if the economy was steady or growing.59  The ability to continue lend-
ing as usual in an economic downturn requires massive amounts of capi-
tal, and this high expectation have led the thirty-five largest banks to add 
a collective $800 billion of the highest quality of capital to their balance 
sheets since 2009.60 
The sheer amount of capital raised in less than ten years is even 
more impressive in light of just how stressful the Federal Reserve’s tests 
are.61  The most stressful hypothetical scenario posed by the Federal Re-
serve, the “severely adverse scenario,”62 envisions a situation in which 
those same thirty-five largest banks would lose a whopping $578 billion 
from a recession and still continue lending.63  According to Randal K. 
Quarles, the Federal Reserve’s vice chairman for supervision, after ap-
plying the severely adverse scenario the firms’ capital levels “are higher 
than the actual capital levels of large banks in the years leading up to the 
most recent recession.”64  This suggests that the largest banks would fare 
much better and be able to continue operating through the downturn if 
faced with another crisis of the magnitude of the 2008 recession.  
Taking a bird’s eye view of the banking industry, the consensus 
opinion is that Dodd-Frank has clearly been successful in making banks 
much safer today than they were ten years ago.65  Since the start of the 
annual stress tests, fewer banks are “failing” the tests, with only one 
(Deutsche Bank) falling short in 2018.66  In 2017, for example, every sin-
gle bank passed their stress tests for the first time.67  Even when banks do 
fail, the penalties imposed by the Federal Reserve typically result in 
 
 59. See Matt Phillips & Jim Tankersley, Biggest Banks Pass Fed’s Stress Tests, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/business/fed-stress-tests-
banks.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FBanking%20Industry (reporting on results of 
this year’s first round of stress tests).  
 60. See BD. OF GOVERNORS 2017,  supra note 13 (detailing the impact and success Dodd-
Frank has had since 2009).  
 61. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2017,  supra note 13. 
 62. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2018, supra note 27. 
 63. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (detailing the progress banks have made in 
their capital structures since the passing of Dodd-Frank).  
 64. Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59. 
 65. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (containing quotes from various financial 
experts who all agree that the banking system is safer, regardless if they agree with the Dodd-
Frank Act or not).  
 66. Eavis, supra note 42. 
 67. See BD. OF GOVERNORS 2017, supra note 13 (reporting results of 2017 stress tests in 
which no banks received a “failing” grade).  
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giving them a running start to pass the following year.68  When a bank is 
forced to decrease its planned dividends payouts or stocks buybacks, that 
money is instead rerouted and added to their capital base, putting the bank 
in a position to reach the capital requirements the next time around.69  In 
the case of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs in 2018, the two banks 
were forced to decrease their dividend payouts and stock buybacks and 
hold those amounts as capital so that they could meet the leverage ratio 
requirements.70  
What is not so clear is whether Dodd-Frank has successfully 
made the banking industry inherently safer or if it has only achieved suc-
cess to the extent that banks are only taking actions necessary to “pass” 
the annual tests.71  Most of the “failures” over the years have stemmed 
from the Federal Reserve objecting to a bank’s proposed capital distribu-
tion plan, not its actual, current capital ratios.72  Take, for example, 
Citigroup’s failures in 2012 and 2014.73  Both years, Citigroup’s capital 
ratio “passed the test easily” and its Tier 1 capital ratio was higher than 
the Tier 1 ratios for JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America – 
all three of which passed the Federal Reserve’s test.74  Nevertheless, 
Citigroup failed both years because its proposed capital distribution plan 
was essentially too aggressive in the Federal Reserve’s eyes.75  Without 
making any substantive changes to its current capital levels and simply 
submitting a different, less aggressive capital plan (i.e., cutting back on 
planned stock buybacks and dividend payments) the following year, 
Citigroup not only passed but “got the cleanest approval from the Federal 
 
 68. See Tracy, supra note 5 (stating CitiGroup failed stress test one year and passed the 
next); Eavis, supra note 42 (covering Wells Fargo’s ability to pass the stress tests despite 
“stringent regulatory action” imposed by the Fed the previous year).  
 69. See Michael Corkery, Citigroup Fails Federal Reserve’s Stress Tests for 2nd Time in 
3 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/fed-rebuffs-
citigroup-on-capital-plans/ (discussing how Citigroup’s failure in 2012 helped usher in a new 
leadership era which resulted in good test results in 2013).  
 70. See Son, supra note 50 (detailing Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs’s requirement 
to put some of the money they desired to expend on buybacks and dividends back into savings 
to increase their capital).  
 71. See James Pethokoukis, So What Exactly did Dodd-Frank Really Accomplish?, 
AEIDEAS (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.aei.org/publication/so-what-exactly-did-dodd-frank-
really-accomplish/ (looking into the long-term beneficial effects of Dodd-Frank and draw-
backs that took some time to surface).  
 72. See Corkery, supra note 69 (stating Citigroup failed due to its capital plan not their 
capital ratio); see also Eavis, supra note 42 (reporting that Deutsche Bank’s 2018 failure was 
due to a rejection in their capital plan rather than their capital ratio).  
 73. Corkery, supra note 69. 
 74. Corkery, supra note 69. 
 75. Corkery, supra note 69. 
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Reserve among top Wall Street banks.”76  Was Citigroup actually “safer” 
that year or did it only conform its behavior to ace the test?  Citigroup 
was safer in the sense that the regulations “did their job” and adjusted the 
behavior of Citigroup to account for safety before growth.77  However, 
Citigroup’s behavior was essentially forced and its rejected capital distri-
bution proposal suggested its own internal risk and reward policies still 
favored aggressive, capitalistic growth over safety.78  This same type of 
disregard for safety contributed to the banking industry’s trouble in 2008 
and that influenced the passing of Dodd-Frank to eradicate such issues.  
Questions of that nature, and a general feeling by some that the 
Federal Reserve’s regulations have gone too far and are now choking 
banks,79 have served as a basis for legislative changes geared toward loos-
ening Dodd-Frank in the last couple years.80 The Trump Administration 
sought to address these questions in February of 2017, when President 
Trump, less than one month after taking office, issued an executive order 
directing the Secretary of Treasury to meet with members of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council81 and provide a report on the effectiveness of 
Dodd-Frank.82 Shortly thereafter, two bills were introduced before Con-
gress to repeal Dodd-Frank to varying degrees.  The first bill, the Finan-
cial CHOICE Act,83 ultimately did not pass, but the second bill, the 
 
 76. See Dakin Campbell, Michael J. Moore & Hugh Son, Citigroup Has Cleanest Fed-
Test Pass of Wall Street Rivals, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/citigroup-has-cleanest-stress-test-pass-of-top-wall-
street-banks (reporting on Citigroup’s comeback from a failure the previous year to passing 
with flying colors the next year).  
 77. Corkery, supra note 69. 
 78. Corkery, supra note 69. 
 79. See Campbell, Moore & Son, supra note 76 (reporting on how some banking heads 
feel Dodd-Frank has imposed too much regulation).  
 80. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“Economic 
Growth Act”) § 2155, 12 U.S.C. § 401 (2012); 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017) (exempting 
twenty-one firms from complying with the qualitative requirements of CCAR).  
 81. The Federal Stability Oversight Council was created by Dodd-Frank. BD. OF 
GOVERNORS 2017, supra note 13. 
 82. Exec. Order No. 13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017) (directing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to consult with members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and report 
their findings of the effectiveness of Dodd Frank). 
 83. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (“To create hope and 
opportunity for investors, consumers, and entrepreneurs by ending bailouts and Too Big to 
Fail, holding Washington and Wall Street accountable, eliminating red tape to increase access 
to capital and credit, and repealing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that make America 
less prosperous, less stable, and less free, and for other purposes.”). 
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Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,84 
was passed.   
The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (the “Reform Law”) signed by President Trump on May 24, 2018 
represents the “largest legal change to financial regulation since passage 
of the Dodd-Frank.”85  Most notably, the Reform Law changed the pool 
of banks subjected to the stress tests.86  The Reform Law provided an 
increase, in two stages, of the minimum asset threshold from $50 billion 
to $250 billion for the Federal Reserve’s requirement of company-run 
stress tests and more broadly for finding that a BHC is systematically 
significant.87 This change freed banks such as SunTrust and BB&T88 
from conducting company-run stress tests and being subjected to the en-
hanced prudential regulation associated with being a systematically sig-
nificant BHC.89  The increase in the SIFI threshold will take effect eight-
een months after the date of enactment for BHCs with total assets of $100 
billion or more but less than $250 billion.90  The Reform Law contains an 
important caveat that the Federal Reserve retains the authority to apply 
the enhanced prudential standards to any specific BHC with total assets 
more than $100 billion, if the Federal Reserve feels it is warranted.91  The 
other stage of the increase raised the asset threshold for a BHC to be 
 
 84. Economic Growth Act § 2155, 12 U.S.C. §401 (2012). 
 85. See Aaron Klein, No, Dodd-Frank Was Neither Repealed nor Gutted. Here’s What 
Really Happened, BROOKINGS (May 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/no-
dodd-frank-was-neither-repealed-nor-gutted-heres-what-really-happened/ (summarizing the 
changes to Dodd-Frank made by the Reform Law). 
 86. See Economic Growth Act § 2155, 12 U.S.C. §401 (modifying the threshold of the 
minimum number of assets of a bank required to comply with Dodd-Frank stress tests).  
 87. Id.; see Matthew Frankel, The Senate Just Passed a Bill to Ease Bank Regulations – 
Here’s What You Need To Know, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 15, 2018), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/03/15/the-senate-just-passed-a-bill-to-ease-bank-regu-
lat.aspx (detailing how particular banks have been effected by the new Reform Law). 
 88. As this note went to the press, SunTrust and BB&T announced initial plans to com-
bine in a roughly $66 billion all-stock merger. This would easily be the largest bank merger 
since the financial crisis in 2008. The merged entity would become the sixth largest bank in 
the U.S. and would then once again be subjected to the enhanced prudential regulations. Jacob 
Passy, SunTrust and BB&T are Merging – Here’s What Customers Need to Know, MKT. 
WATCH (Feb. 9, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/suntrust-and-bbt-are-
merging-heres-what-customers-need-to-know-2019-02-09.  
 89. Economic Growth Act §2155, 12 U.S.C. § 401; see Frankel, supra note 87 (detailing 
how particular banks have been effected by the new Reform Law).   
 90. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 24 (discussing the eighteen month “off-
ramp” that will be applied for those banks that fall in between $100 and $250 billion).  
 91. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 24 (detailing how the Federal Reserve still 
has the discretion to apply the enhanced prudential standards to the BHCs that were just freed 
of that burden in the same law).  
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subjected to supervisory-run stress tests from $50 billion to $100 billion, 
exempting three banks—CIT Group, Comerica, and Zions Bancorp—
from the 2018 round of supervisory-run tests.92  The asset threshold for 
being subjected to the qualitative portion of CCAR had already been 
raised to $250 billion, leaving only about half of the thirty-five banks to 
face the qualitative assessment.93 Some of the mid-size banks now ex-
empt from the tests are allowed to conduct all stress tests internally, rather 
than being supervised by the Federal Reserve’s tests.94  This opens the 
door for these banks to lower their capital cushions in order to increase 
return on equity or pursue more aggressive capital distributions, poten-
tially undoing the safety mechanisms put in place by Dodd-Frank.95 
As the dust settled from the new legislation, it is important to 
point out that the banking landscape did not make a drastic departure from 
the status quo, and Dodd-Frank is still far from dead.96  While there are 
currently only eleven U.S. banks that have greater than $250 billion in 
assets that will be subjected to stress tests, those eleven banks make up 
over half of all the banking industry’s assets and deposits.97  The Reform 
Law also permits the Federal Reserve to apply any of the regulations pre-
viously in place under Dodd-Frank to the banks that were just made ex-
empt from the stress tests if the Federal Reserve feels that is warranted.98  
Public misconception that this new regulation dismantled Dodd-
Frank is not unfounded.99  The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017100 was 
 
 92. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (detailing that the new rules that raised the 
threshold has freed a few banks from being subject to the oversight of Dodd-Frank).  
 93. See Exec. Order No. 13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017) (exempting firms with 
less than $250 billion in assets from complying with CCAR); Tracy, supra note 5 (tracking 
differences in the 2018 stress tests versus previous years).  
 94. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 13 (discussing how 
banks with $100 billion or less in total assets no longer have to submit to supervisory stress 
tests by the Fed).  
 95. The new bill also provides some de-regulation for smaller banks, exempts banks with 
less than $10 billion in assets from the Volcker Rule, and legally requires credit bureaus – 
such as Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion – to provide free credit freezes to consumers. 
 96. See Klein, supra note 85 (dismissing the notion that the Reform Law was any sort of 
complete repeal of Dodd-Frank). 
 97. See Jeff Cox, 5 Biggest Banks Now Own Almost Half of the Industry, CNBC (Apr. 
15, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/15/5-biggest-banks-now-own-almost-half-the-in-
dustry.html (detailing how top heavy the bank industry is).  
 98. See Klein, supra note 85 (discussing that many safeguards of Dodd-Frank are still in 
place and arguing the law is not as big of a reform as the public is conceiving it to be).  
 99. Klein, supra note 85. 
 100. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (“To create hope and 
opportunity for investors, consumers, and entrepreneurs by ending bailouts and Too Big to 
Fail, holding Washington and Wall Street accountable, eliminating red tape to increase access 
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intended to “do a number”101 on Dodd-Frank and passed the House by a 
sizeable margin but ultimately stalled out in the Senate.102  As a result, 
the Reform Law is a much more modest attempt at amending of Dodd-
Frank.103 In fact, symbolic of the Reform Law’s lack of monumental 
changes, it received wide bipartisan support and even Rep. Barney Frank, 
who helped craft Dodd-Frank, said that “90% of the Wall Street Reform 
bill would be unchanged” by the new legislation.104  Republicans hope 
the Reform Law is merely the start, not the end, of further Dodd-Frank 
legislative rollbacks.105  Now that at least the first step has been taken, the 
debate for further rollbacks has begun.106 
IV.  COMPETING ARGUMENTS ABOUT ROLLBACKS OF DODD-FRANK AND 
THE FUTURE OF BANKING REGULATIONS 
There is little, if any disagreement that the banks subjected to the 
stress tests are in a much better position today than they were before the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.107 Instead, the debate is over whether the stress 
tests and enhanced prudential standards are still needed to protect the 
 
to capital and credit, and repealing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that make America 
less prosperous, less stable, and less free, and for other purposes.”). 
 101. Ryan Tracy & Andrew Ackerman, How Congress Rolled Back Banking Rules in a 
Rare Bipartisan Deal, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2018, 1:20 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/how-congress-rolled-back-banking-rules-in-a-rare-bipartisan-deal-1527030512 (quoting 
President Trump’s promise made ten days after his inauguration to make legislation to repeal 
Dodd-Frank).  
 102. Frankel,  supra note 87. 




 104. See Barney Frank, I Have Two Serious Objections to Senate’s Plan to Reform Dodd-
Frank, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/27/barney-franks-
serious-objections-to-senate-dodd-frank-reform-commentray.html (writing his reaction, pros, 
and cons, to the new Reform bill).  
 105. See Thomas Kaplan, Congress Approves First Big Dodd-Frank Rollback, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-dodd-
frank-rollback-for-smaller-banks.html (reporting on republican and democratic policy mak-
ers’ views toward the Dodd-Frank rollback and its future implications).  
 106. See Leandra Bernstein, Trump to Sign Partial Dodd-Frank Repeal: A Financial Win 
or the Start of a New Crisis?, WJLA (May 23, 2018), https://wjla.com/news/nation-
world/trump-to-sign-partial-dodd-frank-repeal (“The bill is only the beginning of a more vig-
orous effort to loosen some of the post-crisis restraints on the financial services sector.”). 
 107. See Ian McKendry, B of A’s Moynihan: Big Banks are ‘Fine’ with Dodd-Frank, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 15, 2018, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/b-of-as-moynihan-big-
banks-are-fine-with-dodd-frank (detailing how Bank of America’s CEO believes that Dodd-
Frank has indeed made banks safer but was a bit of an overreaction in terms of how much 
regulation was included).  
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industry, or whether the regulations have already done their job and are 
now unnecessarily hampering banks from growing themselves – and sub-
sequently the economy.108  
Opinions about regulating the banking industry have been a di-
viding political point for years, and recent legislation is no exception.109  
On one end of the spectrum, Dodd-Frank was a Democratic-led proposal 
that passed with only the support of three republicans in the Senate.110 On 
the other end, the Financial CHOICE Act, which essentially proposed a 
total repeal of Dodd-Frank, passed the House without a single Democrat 
vote before being shut down in the Senate.111  Both bills took what would 
be considered as an extreme stance by the opposing party, and because 
each bill received no support from the opposing party, both either passed 
or failed due to the demographics of Congress at the time.112  The Reform 
Law was a slight concession to Republicans but further legislation seems 
imminent as both sides are far from laying down their torch.113  
A.  Maintaining Regulations  
At a high level, the pro-regulation argument is essentially that the 
citizens at large are the winners of the stress tests and strict regulations of 
banks.114  Whether banks pass or fail, citizens still benefit from being able 
to get a look into a bank’s health and protection from having to fund fu-
ture bailouts with their taxes.115  The pro-regulation side considers Dodd-
Frank to have been a “clear win” in some areas such as increasing both 
 
 108. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (quoting pro-regulator Marcus Stanley on 
the continued need for regulation to keep our financial system safe from another crisis); Mi-
chael Tremoglie, Dodd-Frank’s Unintended Consequences – Wall Street Reaps Benefits of 
D.C. Regulation, THE STREET (Feb. 26, 2015, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13048752/1/dodd-franks-unintended-consequences—wall-
street-reaps-benefits-of-dc-regulation.html (quoting long time critics of Dodd-Frank on the 
consequences that Democrat supporters did not realize at the time).  
 109. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, INV. BUS. DAILY (May 
25, 2018), https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/dodd-frank-refrom/. 
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 111-4173 (2ND SESS. 2010) (tallying votes for the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).  
 111. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 112. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, supra note 109. 
 113. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, supra note 109.  
 114. Eavis, supra note 42. 
 115. See Martin Neil Bailey, Aaron Klein & Justin Schardin, The Impact of the Dodd-
Frank Act on Financial Stability and Economic Growth, RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. (Jan. 2017), 
at 20–47 (assessing key benefits and costs of the Dodd-Frank Act’s attempt to provide needed 
stability in wake of the financial crisis).  
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financial stability and increasing economic growth.116  Now that the econ-
omy has recovered from the financial crisis, Dodd-Frank’s job is still far 
from over. 
The pro-regulation position is that banks routinely passing the 
stress tests should not be taken as a symbol that they are safe and incapa-
ble of falling victim to another crisis like in 2008.117  Rather, passing the 
tests only says that banks have sufficient capital.118  Further, because 
some models also said banks had sufficient capital before the financial 
crisis, the banks passing the tests now should not be taken as a sign that 
the industry no longer “need[s] to be vigilant.”119  
The Reform Law did draw some bipartisan support,120 but ardent 
pro-regulators see the loosened regulations as a threat to financial stabil-
ity.121  Taking special exception to the raise in the threshold from $50 
billion under the original Dodd-Frank provision to the current $250 bil-
lion threshold, the pro-regulation camp argue a rollback of that size is 
“irresponsible.”122  They emphasize that banks in the asset bracket be-
tween $50 billion and $250 billion still play an important role in the coun-
try’s financial well-being.123  Pointing to the financial crisis that took 
place just a decade ago, they highlight specific defunct banks, like Coun-
trywide Financial, that were at the epicenter of the crisis but would now 
be exempt from stress tests.124  
Even some pro-regulators that were more open to some small leg-
islative changes to Dodd-Frank echo the sentiment that the threshold was 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (interviewing pro-regulators for their take 
on banks passing the last round of stress tests).  
 118. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (quoting pro-regulator Marcus Stanley on 
the continued need for regulation to keep our financial system safe from another crisis).  
 119. Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59. 
 120. The law only drew bipartisan support after the Financial CHOICE Act was rejected 
in the Senate and essentially watered-down and reworked to arrive at the Reform Law that 
did actually pass. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, supra note 
109. 
 121. See Kaplan, supra note 105 (reporting on republican and democratic policy makers’ 
views toward the Dodd-Frank rollback and its future implications). 
 122. See Bernstein, supra note 106 (quoting Carter Dougherty, a spokesman for Ameri-
cans for Financial Reform, on the threshold being raised too high).  
 123. See Bernstein, supra note 106 (pointing out that the banks in the $50 billion to $250 
billion bracket still received nearly $50 billion in support funds during the bailout). 
 124. See Bernstein, supra note 106 (arguing that banks like Countrywide Financial are 
living proof that there is still substantial risk to be accounted for in the $50 billion to $250 
billion bracket). 
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raised too high.125  Barney Frank, in reflecting on the influence his name-
sake legislation has had, admitted “the mistake was the $50 billion 
limit.”126  However, Frank and some others in the pro-regulation camp 
agree that raising the limit to $250 billion would be an even greater mis-
take.127  Frank envisions a threshold of $125 billion as the sweet spot and 
accordingly argues that the new threshold is at a level that is “twice as 
high as prudent.”128  He and fellow pro-regulators warn that the failure of 
two or three institutions in the $125–$250 billion bracket would “put us 
in Lehman Brothers territory.”129  
Broadly speaking, the pro-regulation side does agree that Dodd-
Frank unintentionally imposed hardship on smaller and community 
banks.130  This middle ground was a primary reason some Democrats 
were able to come to a consensus with Republicans in passing the bipar-
tisan Reform Law.131  However, for others who couldn’t get on-board 
with the new legislation, the loosening of regulations is a slippery slope 
that could unwind the past ten years of work geared toward strengthening 
the financial system.132  With the Republicans wanting a complete, or at 
least substantial, repeal of Dodd-Frank and having to dilute their reform 
 
 125. Dodd-Frank Author: Current SIFI Threshold is ‘Mistake’, A.B.A. BANKING J. (Nov. 
21, 2016), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2016/11/dodd-frank-author-current-sifi-threshold-
is-mistake/.  
 126. See Barney Frank, Why I Would Vote ‘No’ on Senate Bill to Amend Dodd-Frank, 
CNBC (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/barney-frank-why-i-would-vote-
no-on-senate-bill-to-amend-dodd-frank-commentary.html (discussing what he would do now 
if he was still a member of Congress in regards to banking legislation).  
 127. See id. (discussing that he thinks the new threshold of $250 billion is too high); see 
also Chris Dodd, Dodd: Sen. Crapo’s Bank Reform Bill has One Fatal Flaw, THE HILL (Mar. 
14, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/378211-dodd-sen-crapos-bank-reform-bill-
has-one-fatal-flaw?amp (arguing that the major problem with the new Reform Law is that the 
threshold was raised too high); Kevin Freking, Senate Poised to Change “Too Big To Fail” 
Bank Rules, Other Measures of Dodd-Frank, DENVER POST (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.den-
verpost.com/2018/03/05/senate-ease-dodd-frank-bank-rules/ (quoting Senator Elizabeth 
Warren’s disproval of raising the threshold amount to this amount).   
 128. See Frank, supra note 126 (reasoning that a raise in the threshold was needed but the 
new bill surpasses the mark that would be adequate).  
 129. See Frank, supra note 104 (quoting former Senator Frank on the consequences he 
envisions from raising the threshold to $250 billion).  
 130. See Tremoglie, supra note 108 (quoting long time critics of Dodd-Frank on the con-
sequences that Democrat supporters did not realize at the time).  
 131. See Frank, supra note 104 (speaking on why fellow Democrats supported the new 
law).  
 132. See Phillips & Tankersley, supra note 59 (discussing the general consensus among 
Senators who voted against the reform of Dodd-Frank).   
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bill in order to pass it earlier this year, future proposed legislation is 
poised to be heading down that slope.133 
B.  Deregulating  
At a high level, the de-regulators’ argument centers on the regu-
lations being overly burdensome.134  The regulations are simply too strict 
and are hindering banks from activities that will further grow the econ-
omy, such as partaking in types of proprietary trading and structuring 
their own dividend payout and stock buyback plans.135  As it stands, the 
de-regulators argue that the stress tests are too stringent because the hy-
pothetical stressful scenarios that the Federal Reserve puts the banks 
through are essentially doomsday type situations that are very unlikely to 
happen in real life.136  What’s more, the Federal Reserve increases the 
difficulty of the tests as the overall economic environment improves.137  
Take, for example, the unemployment rate stress measure.  This past year 
the Federal Reserve subjected the banks to a hypothetical 10% unemploy-
ment rate.138  While the actual unemployment rate did peak around 10% 
during the Great Recession, the baseline unemployment rate was much 
higher too.139  The Federal Reserve’s hypothetical unemployment rate of 
10% from the current baseline140 is thus substantially more severe than 
the stressful impacts of the Great Recession.141  This is not a matter of 
 
 133. See Bernstein, supra note 106 (discussing how the Reform Law is not the end game 
for the Trump Administration and fellow de-regulators).  
 134. Hester Pierce, 10 Ways Dodd-Frank Will Hurt The Economy in 2013, U.S. NEWS 
(Jan. 7, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelli-
gence/2013/01/07/10-ways-dodd-frank-will-hurt-the-economy-in-2013. 
 135. See id. (listing expected harmful economic effects of Dodd-Frank that will stem from 
the stifling of small banks and replacing market monitoring with more regulatory monitoring). 
 136. See Frankel, supra note 87 (providing a high-level overview of the aim of Dodd-
Frank).  
 137. See Michelle Price & David Henry, America’s Biggest Banks All Clear the Fed’s 
Stress Test, REUTERS (Jun. 21, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/americas-
biggest-banks-all-clear-the-feds-stress-test-2018-6 (detailing how stress tests change from 
year to year).  
 138. See id. (detailing how stress tests change from year to year).  
 139. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE RECESSION OF 2007–2009, at 2 (2012), 
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf (summarizing 
unemployment rates during the Great Recession).  
 140. The current unemployment rate in America, as of April 2018, is 3.9%. U.S. BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 
(2019), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/lns14000000.  
 141. At the start of the Great Recession the baseline unemployment rate was already at 5% 
so when it peaked around 10%, it only rose half that from the baseline level. U.S. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 139. 
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“rather be safe than sorry,” de-regulators argue, but instead an overboard 
safety precaution that requires banks to face unemployment numbers that 
haven’t been seen since the 1930s Great Depression in the tests.142  De-
regulators make similar arguments over other portions of the test too, 
such as the negative GDP growth.143   
While proponents of deregulation have their gripes about the 
stringent testing, the cardinal sin of Dodd-Frank is that it stifles the little 
guy.144  Small and community banks have been harmed the most, and 
Dodd-Frank’s provisions have given Wall Street an advantage over Main 
Street, something that the most fervent pro-regulator and de-regulator can 
agree was never the goal.145  
Dodd-Frank’s overly complex labyrinth of requirements, meshed 
together in 2300 pages, treats large banks the same as community banks 
in a lot of ways.146  The resulting damage to the smaller community banks 
is twofold: first, larger banks and their team of lawyers are more adept at 
dissecting the web of regulations; second, Dodd-Frank imposes dispro-
portionate and immense compliance and regulatory costs on community 
banks.147  These mandatory compliance programs are unnecessary and 
yet another drain on the bank’s resources—a drain felt most by commu-
nity banks with less resources to begin with.148  Alarmingly, since the 
second quarter of 2010 and the passage of Dodd Frank, community banks 
have seen their share of U.S. commercial banking assets decrease at 
nearly double the rate that their assets decreased from 2006 until 2010.149  
The number of community banks, defined as smaller than $200 million 
for this purpose, has also declined by more than 50% over the last eleven 
 
 142. See Frankel, supra note 87 (detailing the extent of the stress test’s adverse scenarios).  
 143. Like the unemployment rate, the negative GDP rate that was included in the last stress 
test was actually reached during the Great Recession, but when taking the baseline GDP point 
into consideration as well, the Fed’s stressful scenario is again worse than the actual recession 
ever was. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 139. 
 144. Tremoglie, supra note 108. 
 145. See Tremoglie, supra note 108 (detailing how Dodd-Frank’s requirements have ef-
fected smaller community banks).  
 146. FIN. SERVS. COMM., OVERSIGHT OF DODD-FRANK ACT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 
57. 
 147. See Tremoglie, supra note 108 (detailing how Dodd-Frank’s requirements have ef-
fected smaller community banks the most).  
 148. See Douglas J. Elliott, The Volcker Rule Is Still a Bad Idea, BROOKINGS (Mar. 19, 
2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-volcker-rule-is-still-a-bad-idea/ (summariz-
ing the core problems the Volcker Rule imposes from the perspective of a strong supporter of 
Dodd Frank.)  
 149. Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking (M-
RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 37, 2015).  
352 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
years.150  There were almost 6000 banks in 2006 with less than $200 mil-
lion in assets.151  Now, there are only about 2500.152  
Taken as a whole, Dodd-Frank unintentionally caused the lion’s 
share of economic harm to be shouldered by small and community 
banks.153  The banks that played no part in the financial crisis have been 
punished the most.154  As a sign of the community banks’ plight, some 
have even looked to the courts for help and made constitutional chal-
lenges to Dodd-Frank.155  The Reform Law provides some relief, chiefly 
in the exemption from the Volker Rule for banks with $10 billion or less 
in assets,156 but their accelerating loss in market share since Dodd-Frank 
has community banks pushing for further rollbacks.157  
C. Future of Banking Regulations 
The future of banking regulations is largely dependent on politics, 
but the current trend suggests there will be more rollbacks to Dodd-
Frank.158  How much of a rollback and how long it will take are questions 
that are even more uncertain.  The Financial CHOICE Act’s failure to 
garner any bipartisan support highlighted the wide divide between pro 
and de-regulators and seriously dampened the outlook on any significant 
legislative reform.159  The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act restored some of that faith, but the significant 
departure from the Financial CHOICE Act’s proposals shows that 
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Republicans and Democrats are still not on the same page on many issues, 
which could hamper the trend of further rollbacks.160  
The most likely, and perhaps best, solution is to take an “every-
thing in moderation” approach to the rollbacks.  To make a significant, 
or even total, repeal of Dodd-Frank would not give fair deference to the 
positives of Dodd-Frank.  At the same time, however, smaller and incre-
mental rollbacks that cut away at some of the breadth of Dodd-Frank will 
provide relief from exacting regulations while keeping safeguards in 
place.  For example, eliminating the Federal Reserve’s control of divi-
dend payouts and stock buybacks for banks so long as the banks pass the 
quantitative test.161  Indeed, a larger consensus is growing that Dodd-
Frank was a bit of a knee-jerk reaction.162 Dodd-Frank’s sweeping stance 
is evidenced by Congressional Democrats’ show of bipartisan support for 
the Reform Law,163 and by Barney Frank admitting to some of his bill’s 
deficiencies.164  It certainly is possible that if Congress becomes even 
more right-leaning in upcoming elections, then a bill like the Financial 
CHOICE Act could pass with essentially no bipartisan support in the 
same manner Dodd-Frank did.165  However, given the push by the Trump 
administration and the current demographic of Congress being in Repub-
licans’ favor, it seems that the timing of the Financial CHOICE Act’s 
proposal was as good of a chance as any.166  That leaves incremental leg-
islative rollbacks that chip away at Dodd-Frank as the likely path.  
The biggest selling point of the de-regulators thus far is leaving 
the enhanced prudential standards and stress tests on the nation’s biggest 
 
 160. See Klein, supra note 85 (reporting on the Reform Law being a significant departure 
from the core principles of the Financial CHOICE Act).  
 161. See Charles Calomiris, Top 10 Fixes For Dodd-Frank, COLUM. BUS. SCH.: IDEAS & 
INSIGHTS (May 17, 2018), https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/ideas-work/top-10-fixes-
dodd-frank (arguing for the most needed changes to Dodd-Frank as Congress was gearing up 
to release the Reform Law).  
 162. See Tremoglie, supra note 108 (“Many Democrats and Republicans recognize that 
Dodd-Frank has had unforeseen negative consequences . . . .”).  
 163. The Reform bill had an exactly even mix of bipartisan cosponsors: 12 Democrats, 12 
Republicans, and one independent. Ezra Klein, Republicans Are About to Deregulate Banks—
with Democratic Support, VOX (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/explain-
ers/2018/3/6/17081532/republicans-dodd-frank-financial-regulations.  
 164. See Frank, supra note 104 (writing his reaction, pros, and cons, to the new Reform 
bill). 
 165. See H.R. REP. NO.111-4173 (2d Sess. 2010) (tallying votes for the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). 
 166. See U.S. H.R. PRESS GALLERY:  PARTY BREAKDOWN, https://pressgal-
lery.house.gov/member-data/party-breakdown (providing current numbers in House by party 
affiliation); U.S. S.:  PARTY DIVISION, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (provid-
ing current numbers in the Senate by party affiliation).  
354 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
banks intact.167  Despite lobbying from the behemoth banks, if they meet 
the $250 billion threshold, then regulations still have not been loosened 
one bit.168  Considering the fact that the banks that meet that $250 billion 
mark now hold over half of the entire banking industry’s assets and de-
posits, which was actually an unintentional product of Dodd-Frank,169 the 
security blanket Dodd-Frank created is still largely in place.170  After all, 
the biggest fear following the financial crisis was a big bank failure that 
could threaten the whole financial system again, and the Reform Law 
maintained the protections that reduce the likelihood of such a failure.171  
In February of 2017, President Trump issued an executive order 
directing the Secretary of Treasury to meet with members of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Counsel and provide a report on the effectiveness of 
Dodd-Frank.172  The Trump administration released the 149-page report 
in the summer of 2017 and the deficiencies pointed out were echoed in 
the provisions proposed in the amended Financial CHOICE Act that 
passed the House and the Reform Law.173  Thus, that report is one of the 
best sources for providing insight into the direction future laws might 
lead. Key recommendations of the report include providing more regula-
tory relief to smaller banks, specifically to loosen restrictions with respect 
to mortgage lending, reducing the role of the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, and lessening or eliminating altogether the requirement that 
firms that pool and securitize mortgages, retain a portion of the loans to 
protect against loan failure.174  Making these changes, it is argued, will 
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reduce the cost of loans, bolster the housing market, and result in overall 
economic growth as the market is able to expand naturally.175  
As the years continue to pass since Dodd-Frank’s implementa-
tion, the more original supporters of the Act realize that some rollback is 
in the country’s best interest.176  As data of the housing market is com-
piled since Dodd-Frank, the argument for the need of further changes to 
mortgage lending is getting stronger.177  Also noteworthy, Senator Heidi 
Heitkamp, a Democrat who joined Republicans in voting for the Reform 
Law, said that she voted to pass the bill because it puts community banks 
back in the mortgage lending business.178  Heitkamp, speaking on behalf 
of her fellow Democrats who voted against the Reform Law, stated that 
they did not oppose it because of the community banking policies but 
because of the restrictions lifted on mid-sized institutions.179 
With all this in mind, legislation geared toward repealing most of 
the restrictions on community banks is both an appropriate and a probable 
next step in Dodd-Frank reformation. Any material changes in regula-
tions or stress tests for the bracket of the largest banks are unlikely and 
would only harm de-regulators’ attempts to pass legislation if included in 
the same bill.180 Some tweaks to the stress tests are possible—like elimi-
nating the pass/fail aspect—but the tweaks would be minor.181  Relaxing 
the regulations concerning mid-size firms further appears to be the mid-
dle ground where garnering any bipartisan support will be tough to come 
by.182  In time, as the economy improves in relation to recent rollbacks, 
the de-regulators will be in a better position to argue for looser restrictions 
for those mid-size firms.  For now, de-regulators will continue to chip 
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away with smaller legislation changes while the pro-regulation camp 
keeps them from taking up too much ground, all in a delicate balancing 
act.183   
V. CONCLUSION 
Dodd-Frank was enacted in response to a very serious financial 
crisis.184  The legislation may have been an overreaction to a desperate, 
unfamiliar situation that begot such an overreaction.  It was, however, an 
overreaction that still succeeded in making banks safer.185  Stress testing 
the largest banks and keeping their risk exposure in check have made the 
financial system safer.186  The Reform Act recognized that banks with 
$50–$250 billion in assets did not pose the same risks and appropriately 
freed those institutions from the stress test regulatory regime.187  Unin-
tended consequences of Dodd-Frank that do little to make the financial 
system safer invite some additional reform.188  Community banks need 
relief from the restrictions imposed on them due largely to the shortcom-
ings of larger banks.  Dodd-Frank was intended to protect against crisis 
but heavily burdening the banks not responsible for the crisis does no 
good.  Dodd-Frank took too tight a grip on the banking industry. Now, it 
needs to loosen that grip in order to allow the industry to operate and 
grow naturally, to work out its own kinks, and do some of the regulation 
itself.  
 




 183. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, supra note 109 
 184. Stout, supra note 3. 
 185. Pethokoukis, supra note 71.  
 186. BD. OF GOVERNORS 2017, supra note 13. 
 187. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, supra note 109. 
 188. Partial Dodd-Frank Reform is Good, Total Repeal is Better, supra note 109. 
* I would like to thank Joshua Roquemore and Sabrina Galli for their insight and constant 
help in writing this note. I would also like to thank Professor Lissa Broome for the in-depth 
feedback, thoughtful critique, and advice.  
